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Abstract
From its inception, AI has had a rather ambivalent relationship
to humans—swinging between their augmentation and replacement.
Now, as AI technologies enter our everyday lives at an ever increasing
pace, there is a greater need for AI systems to work synergistically
with humans. To do this effectively, AI systems must pay more at-
tention to aspects of intelligence that helped humans work with each
other—including social intelligence. I will discuss the research chal-
lenges in designing such human-aware AI systems, including modeling
the mental states of humans in the loop, recognizing their desires and
intentions, providing proactive support, exhibiting explicable behav-
ior, giving cogent explanations on demand, and engendering trust. I
will survey the progress made so far on these challenges, and highlight
some promising directions. I will also touch on the additional ethi-
cal quandaries that such systems pose. I will end by arguing that the
quest for human-aware AI systems broadens the scope of AI enterprise,
necessitates and facilitates true inter-disciplinary collaborations, and
can go a long way towards increasing public acceptance of AI tech-
nologies.
∗This article is based on the AAAI 2018 Presidential Address that the author had the
honor of delivering in New Orleans in February 2018. The video of the talk, along with
the slides used, is available at http://bit.ly/2tHyzAh
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Introduction
Artificial Intelligence, the discipline we all call our intellectual home, is sud-
denly having a rather huge cultural moment. It is hard to turn anywhere
without running into mentions of AI technology and hype about its expected
positive and negative societal impacts. AI has been compared to fire and
electricity, and commercial interest in the AI technologies has sky rocketed.
Universities – even high schools – are rushing to start new degree programs
or colleges dedicated to AI. Civil society organizations are scrambling to un-
derstand the impact of AI technology on humanity, and governments are
competing to encourage or regulate AI research and deployment.
There is considerable hand-wringing by pundits of all stripes on whether
in the future, AI agents will get along with us or turn on us. Much is
being written about the need to make AI technologies safe and delay the
“doomsday.” I believe that as AI researchers, we are not (and cannot be)
passive observers. It is our responsibility to design agents that can and
will get along with us. Making such human-aware AI agents, however poses
several foundational research challenges that go beyond simply adding user
interfaces post facto. I will argue that addressing these challenges broadens
the scope of AI in fundamental ways.
The need for Human-Aware AI Systems
My primary aim in this talk is to call for an increased focus on human-
aware AI systems—goal directed autonomous systems that are capable of
effectively interacting, collaborating and teaming with humans.1 Although
developing such systems seems like a rather self-evidently fruitful enterprise,
and popular imaginations of AI, dating back to HAL, almost always assume
we already do have human-aware AI systems technology, little of the actual
energies of the AI research community have gone in this direction.
1In a way, it thus follows in the footsteps of Barbara Grosz’s AAAI Presidential Address
[17], which talked about collaborative systems.
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Figure 1: We should build a future where AI systems can be our quotidian
partners
From its inception, AI has had a rather ambivalent relationship to humans—
swinging between their augmentation and replacement. Most high profile
achievements of AI have either been far away from the humans—think Spirit
and Opportunity exploring Mars; or in a decidedly adversarial stance with
humans, be it Deep Blue, AlphaGo or Libatus. Research into effective ways
of making AI systems interact, team and collaborate with humans has re-
ceived significantly less attention. It is perhaps no wonder that many lay
people have fears about AI technology!
This state of affairs is a bit puzzling given the rich history of early con-
nections between AI and psychology. Part of the initial reluctance to work
on these issues had to do with the worry that focusing on AI systems working
with human might somehow dilute the grand goals of the AI enterprise, and
might even lead to temptations of “cheating,” with most of the intelligent
work being done by the humans in the loop. After all, prestidigitation has
been a concern since the original mechanical turk. Indeed, much of the early
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work on human-in-the-loop AI systems mostly focused on using humans as
a crutch for making up the limitations of the AI systems [1]. In other words,
early AI had humans be “AI-aware” (rather than AI be “human-aware”).
Now, as AI systems are maturing with increasing capabilities, the con-
cerns about them depending on humans as crutches are less severe. I would
also argue that focus on humans in the loop doesn’t dilute the goals of AI
enterprise, but in fact broadens them in multiple ways. After all, evolution-
ary theories tell us that humans may have developed the brains they have,
not so much to run away from the lions of the savanna or tigers of Bengal
but rather to effectively cooperate and compete with each other. Psycho-
logical tests such as the Sally Anne Test [30] demonstrate the importance of
such social cognitive abilities in the development of collaboration abilities in
children.
Some branches of AI, aimed at specific human-centric applications, such
as intelligent tutoring systems[29], and social robotics [4, 3, 22], did focus
on the challenges of human-aware AI systems for a long time. It is crucial
to note however that human-aware AI systems are needed in a much larger
class of quotidian applications beyond those. These include human-aware AI
assistants for many applications where humans continue to be at the steering
wheel, but will need naturalistic assistance from AI systems—akin to what
they can expect from a smart human secretary. Increasingly, as AI systems
become common-place, human-AI interaction will be the dominant form of
human-computer interaction [2].
For all these reasons and more, human-aware AI has started coming to the
forefront of AI research of late. Recent road maps for AI research, including
the 2016 JASON report2 and the 2016 White House OSTP report3 emphasize
the need for research in human-aware AI systems. The 2019 White House
list of strategic R&D priorities for AI lists “developing effective methods for
2https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/ai-dod.pdf
3https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse files/
microsites/ostp/NSTC/national ai rd strategic plan.pdf
4
Figure 2: Test beds developed to study the dynamics of trust and teamwork
between autonomous agents and their human teammates.
human-AI collaboration” at the top of the list of priorities4. Human-Aware
AI was the special theme for the 2016 International Joint Conference on AI
(with the tagline “why intentionally design a dystopian future and spend time
being paranoid about it?); it has been a special track at AAAI since 2018.
How do we make AI agents Human-Aware?
When two humans collaborate to solve a task, both of them will develop
approximate models of the goals and capabilities of each other (the so called
“theory of mind”), and use them to support fluid team performance. AI
agents interacting with humans – be they embodied or virtual – will also
need to take this implicit mental modeling into account. This certainly poses
several research challenges. Indeed, it can be argued that acquiring and
reasoning with such models changes almost every aspect of the architecture
of an intelligent agent. As an illustration, consider the architecture of an
intelligent agent that takes human mental models into account shown in
4https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/National-AI-Research-
and-Development-Strategic-Plan-2019-Update-June-2019.pdf
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Figure 3. Clearly most parts of the agent architecture – including state
estimation, estimation of the evolution of the world, projection of its own
actions, as well as the task of using all this knowledge to decide what course
of action the agent should take – are all critically impacted by the need to
take human mental models into account. This in turn gives rise to many
fundamental research challenges. In [15] we attempt to provide a survey of
these challenges. Rather than list the challenges again here, in the rest of
this article, I will use the ongoing work in our lab to illustrate some of these
challenges as well as our current attempts to address them.5 Our work has
focused on the challenges of human-aware AI in the context of human-robot
interaction scenarios [12], as well as human decision support scenarios [23].
Figure 2 shows some of the test beds and micro-worlds we have used in our
ongoing work.
Mental Models in Human-Aware AI
In our ongoing research, we address the following central question in design-
ing human-aware AI systems: “What does it take for an AI agent to show
explainable behavior in the presence of humans?. Broadly put, our answer is
this: : To synthesize explainable behavior, AI agents need to go beyond plan-
ning with their own models of the world, and take into account the mental
model of the human in the loop. The mental model here is not just the goals
and capabilities of the human in the loop, but includes the humans model of
the AI agents goals/capabilities.
Let MR and MH correspond to the actual goal/capability models of the
AI agent and human. To support collaboration, the AI agent needs an ap-
proximation of MH , we will call it M˜Hr , to take into account the goals and
capabilities of the human. The AI agent also needs to recognize that the
human will have a model of its goals/capabilities MRh , and needs an approx-
5A longer bibliography of work related to human-aware AI from other research groups
can be found at http://rakaposhi.eas.asu.edu/cse591 as part of a graduate seminar
at ASU on the topic.
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Figure 3: Architecture of an intelligent agent that takes human mental mod-
els into account. All portions in yellow are additions to the standard agent
architecture, that are a result of the agent being human-aware. MRh is the
mental model the human has of the AI agent’s goals and capabilities and MHr
is the (mental) model the AI agent has of the human’s goal and capabilities
(see the section on Mental Models in Human-Aware AI)
imation of this, denoted M˜Rh . All phases of the “sense–plan–act” cycle of
an intelligent agent will have to change appropriately to track the impact
on these models (as shown in Figure 3. Of particular interest to us in this
article is the fact that synthesizing explainable behavior becomes a challenge
of supporting planning in the context of these multiple models.
In the following, we will look at some specific issues and capabilities pro-
vided by such human-aware AI agents. A note on the model representation:
In much of our work, we have used relational precondition-effect models. We
believe however that our frameworks can be readily adapted to other model
representations; e.g. [26].
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Figure 4: Use of different mental models in synthesizing explainable behavior.
(Left) The AI system can use its estimation of human’s mental model, MHr ,
to take into account the goals and capabilities of the human thus providing
appropriate help to them. (Right) The AI system can use its estimation of
human’s mental model of its capabilities MRh to exhibit explicable behavior
and to provide explanations when needed.
Proactive help: Left to itself, the AI agent will use MR to synthesize
its behavior. When the agent has access to M˜Hr , we show how it can use
that model to plan behaviors that proactively help the human user–either by
helping them complete their goals (c.f. [6]) or avoiding resource contention
with them (c.f. [14]).
Explicability: When the agent has access to M˜Rh , it can use that model
to ensure that its behavior is explainable. We start by looking at generation
of explicable behavior, which requires the AI agent to not only consider the
constraints of its model MR, but also ensure that its behavior is in line with
what is expected by the human. We can formalize this as finding a plan pi
that trades off the optimality with respect to MR and “distance” from the
plan pi′ that would be expected according to M˜Rh . This optmization can be
done either in a model-based fashion, where the distances between pi and
pi′ are explicitly estimated (c.f. [19]) or in a model-free fashion, where the
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distance is indirectly estimated with the help of a learned “labeling” function
that evaluates how far pi is from the expected plan/behavior (c.f. [32]).
Our notion of explicability here has interesting relations to other notions of
interpretable robot behavior considered in AI and robotics communities; we
provide a critical comparison of this landscape in [9].
Explanation: In some cases, M˜Rh might be so different fromM
R that it will
be too costly or infeasible for the AI agent to conform to those expectations.
In such cases, the agent needs to provide an explanation to the human (with
the aim of making its behavior more explicable). We view explanation as
a process of “model reconciliation,” specifically the process of helping the
human bring MRh closer to M
R. While a trivial way to accomplish this is
to send the whole of MR as the explanation, in most realistic tasks, this
will be both costly for the AI agent to communicate, and more importantly,
for the human agent to comprehend. Instead, the explanation should focus
on minimal changes E to MRh , such that the robot behavior pi is explicable
with respect to MRh + E , thus in essence making the behavior interpretable
to human in light of the explanation. In [13] we show that computing such
explanations can be cast as a meta search in the space of models spanning
MR and M˜Rh (which is the AI agent’s approximation of M
R
h ); see Figure 5.
We also provide methods to make this search more efficient, and discuss a
spectrum of explanations with differing properties that can all be computed
in this framework.
Example: To illustrate the ideas of explicability and explanation in a con-
crete scenario, consider a simplified “urban search and rescue” scenario de-
picted in Figure 6. Here the human is in a commander’s role, and is not at the
scene of the search and rescue. The robot (AI agent) – which is at the scene
– collaborates with the human to search for the injured. Both agents start
with the same map of the environment. However, as the robot explores the
environment, it might find that some of the pathways are blocked because of
fallen debris. In the example here, the robot realizes that the shortest path –
9
Figure 5: Computing explanations as model reconciliation involves a search
in the space of the models. Here the AI agent’s model MR is on the right end,
and the human’s model of the AI agent’s capabilities, MRh is on the left. The
search transitions corresponds to model changes (for planning models, these
might be addition/deletion of preconditions and effects). As discussed in [13],
the explanation process involves the AI agent searching for the minimal set
of changes to reconcile the human’s model to the actual model of the AI agent
in the context of the current problem) for details)
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Figure 6: A simplified urban search and rescue scenario where human and
AI agents collaborate.
as expected by the human – is blocked (see the black “obstacle” on the left in
Figure 7). At this point, the robot has two choices. It can be explicable—by
going through the path that the human expects. This will however involve
the robot clearing the path by removing the obstacle (see Figure 7 right
side). Alternately, it can take the path that is optimal to it given the new
map. In this case, the robot’s explanation (to the possibly perplexed) human
commander involves communicating the salient differences between MRh and
MR (see the message on top left in Figure 7).
Balancing Explicability & Explanation: While the foregoing presented
showing explicable behavior and giving explanation as two different ways
of exhibiting explainable behavior, it is possible to balance the trade-offs
between them. In particular, given a scenario where pi∗ would have been the
plan that is optimal with respect to MR, the AI agent can choose to go with
a costlier plan pi (where pi is still not explicable with respect to MRh ), and
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Figure 7: In the case of explicable behavior, the AI agent behaves in the way
the human commander expects it to believe (based on the commander’s model
MRh . This can be costly (and sometimes even infeasible) for the AI agent—as
it is here, for example, where the robot has to remove the obstacle and clear
the path so it can navigate it.
Figure 8: When explicable behavior is too costly or infeasible, the AI agent
can take the path that is optimal to it (given that the original shortest path
is blocked), and provide an explanation. The explanation involves communi-
cating the model differences between MRh and M
R. For our case, this is just
communicating that the shortest path is blocked (see the message at the top
left)
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Figure 9: Assessment of human affective states can be facilitated with brain-
computer interface technologies (such as the Emotive helmet used here) that
can supplement the normal natural communication modalities
provide an explanation E ′ such that pi is explicable with respect to MRh + E ′.
In [10], we show how we can synthesize behaviors that have this trade-off.
Model Acquisition: While we focused on the question of reasoning with
multiple models to synthesize explainable behavior, a closely related question
is that of acquiring the models. In some cases, such as search and rescue
scenarios, the human and AI agent may well start with the same shared model
of the task. Here the AI agent can assume that as the default mental model.
In other cases, the AI agent may have an incomplete model of the human; in
[24], we provide an approach to handle the incomplete model, viewing it as
a union of complete models. More generally, the AI agent may have to learn
the model from the past traces of interaction with the human. Here too, the
agent might get by with a spectrum of potential models–starting from fully
causal specifications (e.g. PDDL) on one end to correlational/shallow models
on the other (see Figure 11) In [28, 31], we discuss some efficient approaches
for learning shallow models.
Communicating with Humans: Much of our work focuses on the me-
chanics of synthesizing explainable behavior assuming the availability of the
human mental models. A closely related problem is sensing the affective
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Figure 10: The AI agent can project its own intentions to the human with
the help of augmented reality technologies such as Hololens
states of human in the loop, and communicating the AI agent’s own inten-
tions to the human. This communication can be done in multiple natural
modalities including speech and language and gesture recognition [5]. The
human-AI communication can also be supported with the recent technolo-
gies such as augmented reality and brain-computer interfaces. Some of our
own work looked at the challenges and opportunities provided by these tech-
nologies for effective collaboration. Figure 9 shows how off-the-shelf brain
computer interfaces supplement natural communication modalities in assess-
ing human affective states. Figure 10 illustrates how the agent can project its
intentions with the help of augmented reality technologies such as hololens
(that project the agent’s intentions into human visual field). In [25], we look
at the challenges involved in deciding when and what intentions to project.
Multiple Humans & Abstraction:: The basic framework above can be
generalized in multiple ways. In [27], we show how we can handle situations
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Figure 11: AI agents can focus on learning a spectrum of human models–
starting from fully causal specifications (e.g. PDDL) on one end to correla-
tional/shallow models on the other
where the human and AI agent have models at different levels of abstraction.
In [27] we consider explanations in the context of specific “foils” (e.g. “why
not this other type of behavior?”) presented by the humans. In [24], we
consider how the AI agent can handle multiple humans – obviously with
different models (MRhi) – in the loop, and develop the notions of “conformant”
vs. “conditional explanations.”
after 1st: We should point out that foils allow for reduction of cognitive
load for humans
Self-Explaining Behaviors: While the foregoing considered explanations
on demand, it is also possible to directly synthesize self-explaining behaviors.
In [12], we show how the agent can make its already synthesized behavior
more explicable by inserting appropriate “projection” actions to communi-
cate its intentions, and also discuss a framework for synthesizing plans that
takes ease of intention projection into account during planning time. In [25],
we show how we can synthesize “self-explaining plans,” where the plans con-
tain epistemic actions, which aim to shift MRh , followed by domain actions
that form an explicable behavior in the shifted model.
Human Subject Evaluations: An important disciplinary challenge posed
by research in human-aware AI systems is that of systematic evaluation with
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Figure 12: Evaluation spirals for human-aware AI systems
human subjects. The temptation of a bunch of engineers unilaterally what
sort of support humans will prefer should be resisted. In our own work,
we collaborate with researchers in human-factors, and draw on their work
on human-human teaming, as well as wizard-of-oz studies [16, 21]. We also
evaluate the effectiveness of your systems with systematic human subject
studies. Figure 12 shows the evaluation spirals. In [11], we show that people
indeed exchange the type of explanations we compute, and that the need for
explanations diminishes when the behavior is explicable.
Explanations, Provenance and Explainable AI
Explainable AI (aka XAI) has become quite an active research topic re-
cently. However, much of the work there is concerned with providing “de-
bugging tools” for inscrutable representations (such as those learned by deep
networks for perceptual tasks), rather than as a means to human-AI collab-
oration. A significant part of the work in XAI is concerned with “pointing
explanations”—such as pointing the regions of an image that lead to it being
classified as an Alaskan Husky or a rare lung disease. Pointing explanations
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Figure 13: A setup for evaluating the effectiveness of explanations produced by
the AI agent in a simulated search and rescue scenario. Here the participants
assumed the role of external commander and evaluated the plans provided
by the AI agent. They could request for plans as well as explanations for
those plans, and rate those plans as optimal or suboptimal based on that
explanations (from [11])
are however primitive. Imagine trying to explain/justify a decision that was
made by an AI system as part of a sequential decision making scenario. Prim-
itive pointing explanations will have to point to regions of space-time tubes.
Another thread of research related to “explanations” is providing provenance
of decision. Such provenance (or certificate of correctness) is often in terms
of the AI agent’s own internal model and is not intended to make sense to
the human in the loop. Model reconciliation view, in contrast, can provide
explanations in terms of the features of the human and robot models of the
task. They thus hew closer to psychological theories of explanation (e.g.
[20]).
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Ethical Quandaries of Human-Aware AI Systems
Evolutionarily, mental modeling allowed us to both cooperate and compete
with each other. After all, lying and deception are possible to a large extent
because we can model others’ mental states! Thus human-aware AI systems
with mental modeling capabilities bring a fresh new set of ethical quandaries.
We should also be cognizant of the fact that human’s anthropomorphizing
tendencies are most pronounced for emotional/social agents. After all, no
one who saw Shakey for the first time thought it could shoot hoops; yet the
first people interacting with Eliza6 assumed it is a real doctor and would
pour their hearts out to it (prompting Weizenbaum to abort the project!).
Although our primary focus has been on explainable behavior for human-
AI collaboration, an understanding of this also helps us solve the opposite
problem of generating behavior that is deliberately hard to interpret, some-
thing that could be of use in adversarial scenarios. In [18], we present a
framework for controlled observability planning, and show how it can be
used to synthesize both explicable and obfuscatory behavior.
Finally, use of mental models not only helps collaboration but also can
open the door for manipulation. In principle, the framework of explanation as
model reconciliation allows for the AI agent to tell white lies by bringing MRh
closer to a model different from MR. For example, your personal assistant
that has a good mental model of you can tell you white lies to make you
eat healthy. In [8, 7], we explore the question of whether and when it is
reasonable for AI agents to lie.
Epilogue
In summary, human-aware AI systems bring in a slew of additional research
challenges (as well as a fresh new set of ethical ones). It may seem rather
masochistic on our part to focus on these research challenges. As a character
from Kurt Vonnegut’s Player Piano remarks:
6https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA
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“If only it weren’t for the people, the goddamned people,” said
Finnerty, “always getting tangled up in the machinery. If it
weren’t for them, earth would be an engineer’s paradise.”
On reflection however, it is easy to see that these are challenges very much
worth suiting up for. After all, some of our best friends are human!
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